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Abstract 
In this paper we connect two of the main and current lines of research in the development and 
economic growth literature: The analysis of the effect and transmission channels of inequality 
on economic growth and the discussion about the necessity for a broader development and 
prosperity measure. We estimate the effect of net income inequality on the Human Develop-
ment Index and its components in a panel of 117 countries over the period of 1970 to 2010. In 
doing so, we find evidence for (1) a negative long-run effect and (2) different short-run im-
pacts of inequality on the different dimensions of development: A positive short-run effect on 
economic development, but a negative one on education outcomes, hinting at particular 
transmission channels. In addition, we detect (3) that those effects can be even more pro-
nounced with low levels of development, reconciling seemingly conflicting previous findings 
in the literature. Moreover, (4) we find some evidence suggesting that the impact of inequality 
on human development is negatively dependent on the prevailing level of inequality. Finally, 
we highlight and discuss some interesting directions for future and subsequent research based 
on our work. 
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1 Introduction   
 
The debate about the impact of inequality on economic growth has been in the center of a 
wide range of economic research for decades. At the same time, the development literature 
saw a growing discussion about the necessity for an alternative development measure that is 
based on a broader concept of prosperity and includes more dimensions of wellbeing. The 
Human Development Index (HDI) emerged as an alternative to pure income measures like 
GDP. Yet, little effort has been made to explicitly connect and merge these two lines of 
thought in order to study the effect of income inequality on alternative development measures 
in general or “human development” as defined by the Human Development Index in particu-
lar. This has been the case even though the foundation of the two issues can both be traced 
back to as far as Kuznets who in his famous Kuznets’ curve established a hypothesis about the 
reverse effect, the one of economic growth on inequality (Kuznets 1955) -  and in connection 
to his work on national accounting added that the welfare of a nation could not be inferred to 
from a measure of national income (Kuznets 1932). More recently, thorough studies look at 
the complexity of the impact of inequality on development in more detail and find evidence 
for the simultaneous existence of different transmission channels or different “types” of ine-
quality. Some of the transmission channels we will see are clearly and directly connected to 
other dimensions of development like socio-political factors and education topics and only in 
turn and indirectly affect income. Likewise, the differentiation between “structural inequality” 
connected to institutional factors and equality of opportunities on the one side and “market 
inequality” linked to market forces and equality of outcomes on the other clearly point to-
wards the differentiation between different aspects of development as well (WDR 2006; East-
erly 2007). Still, the connection between inequality and an alternative measure capturing these 
different dimensions of development has not been made explicitly and empirically.  
Consequently, this paper sets out to empirically study the effects of income inequality 
proxied by the net Gini coefficient on HDI and its components in a panel of 117 countries 
over the period from 1970 to 2010. We try to assess if our results are different from those ob-
tained with pure income measures and strive to link them to the different types of inequality 
and/or the different theoretically or empirically established transmission channels through 
which inequality affects development. Moreover, we try to find out if this complex relation-
ship is dependent on further factors and characteristics. In order to answer these questions we 
estimate different panel model specifications with various estimation techniques to differenti-
ate between short- and long-run effects and find evidence for different effects and channels, as 
well as dependencies and structural (in)stabilities. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews and merges the 
literature on the two important relationships, inequality and economic development on the one 
side and economic and human development on the other. Section 3 presents the underlying 
database before Section 4 specifies the empirical model to be estimated. The main results are 
displayed and discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
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2 Literature Review 
 
1) The effects of inequality on economic growth 
 
The investigation of the causal relationship between inequality and economic growth was 
brought to the focus of modern economic research by Simon Kuznets (1955) who found an 
inverted U-shape impact of per capita GDP on income inequality. Thus, this famous Kuznets’ 
curve illustrates the hypothesis that economic development initially increases inequality for 
low levels of GDP, but eventually, that is to say for sufficiently larger values of GDP, the 
effect inverts so that further economic growth decreases inequality. Kaldor famously (1956, 
1957) reversed the direction of causality and argued that unequal income distributions can be 
conducive to economic growth through a higher marginal propensity to save in the top income 
classes. The overproportional increase of the share of income that is saved enables the accu-
mulation of higher investments in physical and human capital fostering economic growth. 
The modern study of inequality and economic growth - and the two-way causal chan-
nels through which they affect each other - was born. However, the net result and general in-
terpretation was still dominated by the belief that early development stages exhibit a trade-off 
between equity and economic development in which inequality can induce growth and would 
itself eventually be attenuated by increasing levels of GDP. Taken together with Solow’s 
(1956) theory of convergence to the same growth paths this body of research was commonly 
invoked as a rationale for liberal development, trade and growth policies in subsequent years. 
 
The next 60 years saw a wide range of theoretical and empirical studies about the im-
pact of inequality on growth, its signs and magnitudes.
1
 Despite gradual improvements in 
theoretical sophistication, country and year coverage as well as econometrical techniques, the 
results and evidence were all but unanimous, unambiguous and conclusive. One important 
deduction to take away from this controversy and its conflicting results is the insight that the 
effect of inequality on economic growth is highly complex and heterogeneous.
2
 It might de-
pend on several factors, including the extent, type and persistency of inequality, the (initial) 
level of development, other - potentially country-specific - characteristics and the time hori-
zon of analysis. Interestingly, most of the studies that find empirical evidence for a positive 
overall impact of inequality on subsequent economic growth, like Forbes (2000) for example, 
rely on panel data and suggest a positive short-run effect. On the other hand, studies based on 
cross-country analysis and focusing on long-run effects tend to find a negative impact of ine-
quality on economic performance (e.g. Alesina and Rodrik 1994; Persson and Tabellini 1994; 
and Easterly 2007).
3
 Barro (2000) finds a growth effect that depends on a countries’ income 
and is negative in poor countries, but positive in rich countries. Chen (2003) on the other hand 
presents evidence suggesting that the effect depends on the initial income distribution itself 
with the effect of inequality being positive when initial inequality is low and negative when it 
is high. 
 
                                                          
1 See Ehrhart (2009) and Galor (2009) for thorough and comprehensive surveys. 
2 Neves and Silva (2013) review some of the empirical literature and try to explain the reasons behind conflicting results. 
3 See Benabou (1996) for a literature review of these empirical cross-section studies. 
4 
 
In the light of acknowledging the complexity and heterogeneity of the inequality-
growth nexus, many studies have concentrated on investigating the different impact and 
transmission channels through which inequality affects economic growth. The theoretical lit-
erature has identified a wide range of different positive and negative channels that contribute 
to an overall effect. We go on to briefly summarize them: 
The positive mechanisms circle around 1) the aforementioned higher savings rate 
(Kaldor 1956), 2) imperfect capital markets with investment indivisibilities (Aghion et al. 
1999) in physical and human capital and 3) growth-enhancing incentives created by inequality, 
for example incentives for capital accumulation and innovations (Mirrlees 1971). 
On the other side, the literature has identified various mechanisms through which ine-
quality can have a negative and limiting effect on growth. 1) Inequality is typically associated 
with greater socio-political instability and risk of social conflict and unrest, implying uncer-
tainty of property rights and reduction of investment (Alesina and Perotti 1996). 2) In an ap-
proach influenced by political economy higher redistributive pressure may lead to economic 
distortions and disincentives (Alesina and Rodrik 1994; Persson and Tabellini 1994), as well 
as unproductive waste of resources by lobbying against it (Acemoglu and Robinson 2008; 
Stiglitz 2009; Krugman 2012). 3) Inequality combined with credit-market imperfections and 
set-up costs reduce the possibilities of low income groups to invest in human capital, thus 
diminishing average human capital investment and long-run growth (Galor and Zeira 1993). 
Other authors point out 4) the importance of the middle class for aggregated demand and 
market size (Murphy et al. 1989; Todaro 1997) or 5) the link between inequality, higher en-
dogenous fertility rates and reduced education and growth (Barro 2000; Ehrhart 2009). 
For our analysis it is both interesting and important to note and argue that generally 
speaking the positive transmission channels appear to be associated with an economic effect 
in the narrower sense, that is to say they have a more direct and immediate impact on eco-
nomic and national accounting outcomes like GDP or GNI, precisely via savings and invest-
ment. The negative mechanisms on the other hand, particularly 1), 2) and 5), are connected to 
an economic effect in a broader and more indirect sense. Inequality affects opportunities, edu-
cation as well as health outcomes and thus the socio-political landscape which themselves 
have an impact on people’s behavior that ultimately affects economic performance. Conse-
quently, we could expect that the overall impact of inequality on GDP tends to be more posi-
tive than the impact on an alternative welfare measure like HDI that is based on a wider defi-
nition of prosperity and captures more dimensions of well-being and development. 
In a related and comparable manner, some authors have differentiated between two 
distinct types of inequality and divided overall inequality into two components. The World 
Bank World Development Report 2006 distinguishes between “equality of opportunities” and 
“equality of outcomes” (WDR 2006) and Easterly (2007) denotes similar concepts as “struc-
tural inequality” and “market inequality”. The first component refers to inequality of indi-
vidual possibilities due to social, political and institutional structures. It is expected to be 
harmful to growth and development and manifests itself in education and health outcomes in a 
first step and subsequent economic achievements in a second step. The latter inequality com-
ponent however is associated with market forces and creates necessary incentives for invest-
ment, innovation and growth via unequal market outcomes and unequal economic success for 
different levels of skill and education.  
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Some studies have tried to empirically assess certain negative transmission channels 
individually and in a two step procedure. By initially analyzing the relationship between ine-
quality and a variable chosen to proxy the mechanism under investigation, to then see the ef-
fect of this variable on growth in a second step.
4
 However, comprehensive empirical studies 
and evidence about the (simultaneous) growth effects of different transmission channels or 
components of inequality are still relatively scarce. Castells-Quintana and Royuela (2014) 
incorporate the different mechanisms in a single empirical model and analyze them jointly in 
a cross-country framework. They instrument the various channels and use a system of recur-
sive equations by means of a control function approach in order to assess their relevance and 
weights. In this way they find a simultaneous positive and negative effect of inequality on 
growth. The negative channels account for around 80% of the total effect, while the channels 
exact weights depend crucially on country circumstances. 
 
 
2) Human Development: The Index, Criticism and Defense 
 
The motivation and meaningfulness of investigating the impact of inequality on an alternative, 
broader welfare measure in general and HDI in particular has already been established above. 
It can be justified by the discussion about the multifarious transmission channels and different 
types of inequality. In the following section we will contribute to this argument and have a 
brief look at HDI and its development. We also look at the comparison to GDP and criticism 
the index has received. 
Interestingly, the fundamental motivation underlying HDI can be traced back to Kuz-
nets as well. While being one of the main originators of the system of national accounts and 
GDP, Kuznets added in an early report to the US congress that “the welfare of a nation can 
scarcely be inferred from a measure of national income” (Kuznets 1932). In the first Human 
Development Report (HDR) in 1990, 58 years later, the opening lines sound more elaborate, 
but still remarkably similar at the core: “People are the real wealth of a nation” (UNDP 1990) 
 
"The basic purpose of development is to enlarge people's choices. […] People often 
value achievements that do not show up at all, or not immediately, in income or 
growth figures: greater access to knowledge, better nutrition and health services, 
more secure livelihoods, security against crime and physical violence, satisfying lei-
sure hours, political and cultural freedoms and sense of participation in community 
activities. The objective of development is to create an enabling environment for peo-
ple to enjoy long, healthy and creative lives." (UNDP 1990) 
 
Of course, even in this view income remains an important factor and is crucial for achieving 
higher standards of living and more opportunities, but it is still more of a mean than an end in 
itself. These ideas are based on the work of Economists Mahbub ul Haq (1994) and Amartya 
Sen’s (1985, 1993, 1999) so called capability approach. They resulted not only in the HDRs, 
but also in the creation of the Human Development Index (HDI) as an alternative measure of 
                                                          
4
 Seminal papers of this kind are Perotti (1996), Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Alesina and Perotti (1996).  
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well-being, prosperity and development. HDI is a multidimensional, composite index of three 
human development dimensions - health, knowledge and income. Since some changes were 
introduced in 2010, it is a geometric mean of life expectancy at birth, PPP-adjusted GNI per 
capita and an education index which in turn is measured by expected years of schooling for 
children and mean years of schooling for adults.
5
 As the sub-indices are normalized between 
0 and 1, so is the aggregated indicator which allows for standardized comparison and ranking 
of countries. The index has been published annually by the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme (UNDP) in their Human Development Reports since 1990.  
 The emergence of human development measures can be seen as part of the extensive 
and still ongoing discussion and criticism of GDP as the main indicator for economic progress 
and development (Hicks and Streeten 1979; Kenny 2005; Stiglitz et al 2008; European Com-
mission 2009). Sagar and Najam (1998) noted that HDI has become an important alternative 
to the traditional one-dimensional measures. In fact it became the most commonly used alter-
native to GDP. Despite this impact in policy and academic circles, the HDI has been subject 
to a considerable amount of criticism from its start.
6
 Two commonly invoked aspects of criti-
cism concentrate on the choice of sub-indicators and the computational methodology (e.g. 
Srinivasan 1994; Noorbakhsh 1998; Decancq and Lugo 2013). While not entirely resolved, 
some of this criticism has been met by improving the sub-indicators over the years and adjust-
ing the functional form in 2010. As a third and main point of criticism many authors focused 
on claiming the redundancy of the index in comparison with GDP. McGillivray (1991), Cahill 
(2005) and Wolfers (2009) find high correlations of around 0.9 of HDI with GDP, GNP or 
GNI per capita, therefore suggesting that the latter are as good of a development and growth 
proxy as HDI, that the index does not contribute any additional information and is thus redun-
dant. Other economists have tried to respond to this criticism and to defend HDI. For one 
thing, Rodriguez (2009) points out that these very high correlations are often based on the 
comparison of the rankings of countries according to the two measures, not on the actual val-
ues themselves. This tells only part of the story. Moreover, it is evident that the two measures 
show a substantial amount of connection and correlation, as firstly income is a part of HDI 
and secondly all the variables are interconnected and interdependent. Economic growth can 
promote human development via private incentives and consumption opportunities as well as 
higher tax revenue and public service expenditure (Ranis 2004; Suri et al. 2011). In the other 
direction, advances in human development foster growth as healthier and more educated indi-
viduals can contribute more to the economic performance of a country (Ranis et al. 2000). Yet 
initially, mere correlation does not imply causality and even after identifying the above struc-
tural dependence the two indicators are still by no means “the same thing”. A more sophisti-
cated correlation analysis confirms this contention. Dep (2015) finds that even the strong 
overall rank correlation can break down when analyzing particular years or different income 
groups of countries separately, especially for middle and high income nations. Other authors 
show that when analyzing changes or growth rates of the indicators instead of levels, the cor-
relation significantly weakens. It can totally break down or even be negative when doing the 
same for the non-income components of HDI on the one and GDP on the other side. Thus, the 
                                                          
5 See data part in Section 3 for the functional formulation of the Index (Hybrid HDI). 
6 See Klugman et al. (2011) for a summary and review of criticism. The last-mentioned Sagar and Najam (1998) study while 
acknowledging HDI’s importance also criticizes the index. 
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implied argument is that the two indicators react dissimilarly to the same causes and are in 
fact substantially different (Rodriguez 2009; Gray Molina and Purser 2010; Klugman et al. 
2011). To summarize, GDP and HDI are correlated, because as societies develop all three 
components usually advance and richer countries tend to be healthier and more educated as 
well. Yet, this connection does not translate one-to-one. Economic growth does not necessari-
ly translate into human development and several dimensions can remain unchanged even if 
GDP is striving. Thus, development and economic growth should not be seen as the same 
thing and HDI can bring more dimensions and insights to the development discussion. 
 
The main purpose of the present work is to connect the two different lines of thought 
and research - the inequality-growth nexus on the one side, the discussion about alternative 
development measures on the other. We set out to empirically study the effect of inequality on 
a broader concept of human development as measured by HDI (and its components). This 
connection has not received much attention in the literature and no study, to the best of our 
knowledge, has explicitly and empirically studied this impact on human as opposed to “mere” 
economic development. In doing so we can assess previous findings about the channels 
through which inequality affects development and try to find evidence of our own. 
 
3 Data 
 
Our main dependent variable is human development as measured by HDI and its components. 
Since we are interested in analyzing long-term historical trends we rely on the Hybrid HDI. 
This index takes into account past changes in the HDI calculation and has been introduced 
and published by the UNDP in the Human Development Report 2010 (UNDP 2010) to ensure 
comparable data and allow for a systematic assessment of trends in human development over 
time. The Hybrid HDI applies the same aggregation formula as the new HDI to the set of pre-
vious indicators - literacy and gross enrollment for the education index and GDP per capita as 
the income variable. This does not only allow for greater country and year coverage, but is 
also more suitable to understand past progress (Gidwitz et al. 2010). The Hybrid HDI is avail-
able from 1970 to 2010 and is covering 135 countries that account for 92% of the world’s 
population. It is computed as follows: 
 
                          
 
 
 
where: 
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and: 
     
       
                                     
 
     
     
                          
 
 
where Lit is the literacy rate, GER the combined gross enrolment rate, Life the Life expectan-
cy at birth, and GDP the Gross Domestic Product per capita, PPP adjusted and measured in 
dollars. 
 
For our main explanatory variable of interest, the inequality measure, we build on Gini 
coefficients in Frederick Solt’s Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) 
(Solt 2014).
7
 In this database Solt standardizes the United Nations University's World Income 
Inequality Database (WIID) and data from other secondary sources with a custom missing-
data imputation algorithm. The algorithms tries to take into account as much inequality in-
formation as possible. Data collected by the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) serves as the 
benchmark and standard. The goal of SWIID is to maximize comparability of income inequal-
ity data while maintaining the widest possible coverage across countries and years. The data-
base provides comparable Gini indices of gross and net income inequality for 174 countries 
from 1960 to 2013 along with estimates of the uncertainty of these values. The SWIID data 
are given as 100 imputations per observation and variable that reflect the mean value and un-
certainty for each country-year-Gini triple. In this paper we rely on the net Gini coefficients 
that reflect net (that is post-tax, post-transfer) income inequality, because the benchmark is 
taken directly from the LIS key figures, many of our transmission channels are based on dis-
posable income, and Solt generally recommends using the net inequality series (Solt 2014).
8
 
Other researchers like Milanovic (2013) and Jenkins (2015) criticized earlier versions 
of SWIID and its imputation procedure, especially for single country investigations and data-
poor regions. The acknowledge that their doubts are less grave in research interested in inter-
national cross-country trends. Solt (2015) defends that part of the criticism has become irrele-
vant with the latest version of his database while other parts are based on misunderstanding 
either his database or acknowledged advice for cross-national inequality research. He shows 
that the current SWIID version does not only provide the broadest coverage, but also per-
forms better in terms of comparability than other available sources. In other words, it does 
better in predicting the LIS values, recognized in the field as the gold standard (Solt 2014). 
We rely on Solt’s SWIID, because our study is interested in an analysis of global cross-
country trends and a broad data coverage. At the same time, we keep in mind its limitations, 
treat the Gini values as variables measured with uncertainty or error and adjust estimation 
methods accordingly. Specifically, we use estimation methods that are designed to deal with 
estimations on multiply imputed (MI) data. 
 
                                                          
7
 The main econometric approach in estimating the inequality impact on development has been to introduce a single inequal-
ity measure into a growth equation. The most used and available measure is the Gini Coefficient. Other authors also employ 
the Theil index or shares or ratios of percentiles along the income distribution. 
8 The argument behind this recommendation is that market inequality cannot be seen as pre-government, but is influenced 
and biased by market-conditioning policies and policy feedback. 
9 
 
For the control variables we follow the literature of the determinants of cross-country 
differences in economic growth and development as well as the few studies incorporating 
HDI explicitly. For the most part they rely on the same or similar controls.
9
 The data on these 
variables are taken either from the Penn World Tables (Heston et al. 2012) or the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators (World Bank 2016). Table A.1 in the Appendix com-
prises all our variables, their definition, the source from which the data is collected and in-
formation about the available country and year coverage. Here, we take a brief look at the 
control determinants and hint at seminal papers that established the respective theoretical or 
empirical link to growth and development. 
Investment (% of GDP). A known traditional argument is that countries with higher total in-
vestment relative to their GDP tend to grow and develop faster than countries with a lower 
investment share (e.g. Harrod (1939), Domar (1946), Rostow (1959)). 
Government Consumption (% of GDP) can be seen as reflecting aspects of fiscal policy and 
the need to support the domestic market. Grier and Tullock (1989) found a negative effect of 
the growth of government consumption on GDP growth. 
Openness. The share of exports plus imports relative to GDP provides a measure of how open 
to international trade and connected with the global economy a particular country is. Many 
authors and institutions argue that trade openness together with exploiting comparative ad-
vantages are important factors fostering development.  
Inflation. According to Stockman (1981) “cash-in-advance” economies with higher (antici-
pated) inflation rates experience reduced economic activity and development. 
Urbanization. On the whole, theory and empirical evidence tend to suggest a positive effect of 
agglomeration on growth and development. However, this is not undisputed or unconditional, 
but likely to depend on several factors. Castells-Quintana and Royuela (2014) show that Ag-
glomeration can be growth enhancing, especially in early development stages with modest 
inequality, but that this effect can reverse in high-income economies with high inequality. We 
consider UrbanPop, the percentage of the population that lives in urban agglomerations. 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics
10
: 
 
Figure 1 depicts the first part of descriptive analysis, while at the same time motivating the 
use of HDI by addressing the issue of redundancy – the question whether HDI and GDP 
measure the “same thing”. The first panel shows a strong correlation between HDI and the 
income index frequently pointed out by critics of HDI. Panel B plots the income index against 
the “Social HDI”, the geometric mean of the education and health indices. It displays that the 
relationship begins to weaken while still being strong. We see substantial variation and the 
correlation weakens even more in panel C, when plotting the absolute difference between 
2010 and 1970 of the income index and HDI respectively. When doing the same for the 
change in the income index and Social HDI in the last panel, the positive relationship totally 
                                                          
9 See Barro (1991) and Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) for seminal papers cross-section papers on the determinants of economic 
growth. 
10As in our empirical model we will define the time dimension t as five-year intervals in between 1970 and 2010, we perform 
our descriptive analysis on the same data selection. The decision and reasons will be discussed with our empirical model in 
section 4. 
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breaks down and even turns negative. While we do not argue that the relationship between 
GDP growth and the change of the non-income development dimension is inherently negative, 
these correlation results support the stance that HDI and GDP are actually distinct and might 
react to different causes or differently to the same causes.  
 
 
 
The descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the present study are summarized in Ta-
ble 1. We can see that while most of the variation of both HDI and the Gini Index are ob-
served between countries, there is also some variation within countries over time. 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
    
            Mean Standard deviation Max Min 
      Overall Between Within     
 
HDI 0.61 0.19 0.18 0.05 0.94 0.12 
 
Gini 36.52 9.31 8.59 3.49 62.28 17.65 
 
GovConsumption 10.08 7.03 6.21 2.98 56.80 0.83 
 
Investment 22.44 10.04 7.87 6.13 66.77 1.30 
 
Openness 68.04 46.22 38.76 24.76 398.18 3.95 
 
Inflation 50.17 495.16 155.58 466.34 12,338.66 -17.02 
  UrbanPop 50.75 23.85 23.11 6.17 100 2.85 
        
11 
 
Figure 2 graphs the correlation between HDI and the Gini Coefficient and displays the overall, 
within and between variation. The overall correlation between HDI and the Gini inequality 
measure is negative. Interestingly, there is a slightly positive correlation within countries over 
time, but the correlation between countries is negative and larger in terms of absolute value. 
While this mere correlation does not allow for any causal inference, this fact could be seen as 
in line with the reviewed empirical literature were we observed that time-series and fixed ef-
fects models tend to suggest a positive (short-run) effect of inequality on development where-
as cross-country studies seem to find a negative (long-term) impact. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Correlation between Gini coefficient and HDI 
    
 
  Time fixed effects 
 
  No Yes 
 
Country fixed effects 
  
 
  No -0.4704 -0.4748 
 
  Yes  0.1145 -0.0904 
     
Table 2 presents this same relationship between our key variables in quantitative results for 
the correlation coefficient and in more detail. It can be seen that there is a fairly strong nega-
12 
 
tive correlation of -0.47 in the raw data (overall variation) that depends on average country 
performance. When we apply the fixed effects dimensions country and time separately, we 
observe that the overall correlation does not change with respect to the raw data when control-
ling for time effects only (-0.47). However, it does change drastically and even is slightly pos-
itive when controlling for country, but not time effects (0.11). When we add time fixed effects 
again to control for both, the correlation turns negative again (-0.09). The above resembles 
what we have seen in Figure 2. 
Table 3 shows the correlation of the raw data (overall variation) for all our variables 
and table 4 does the same after controlling for country and time effects. It can be observed 
that especially the correlations with high absolute values, e.g. between HDI and Urban Popu-
lation, substantially decrease when looking at changes over time by controlling for country 
effects (or looking at growth rates). 
 
 
Table 3. Correlation Raw Data (Overall Variation) 
   
             HDI Gini GovCons Investment Openness Inflation UrbanPop 
 
HDI 1 
      
 
Gini -0.4744 1 
     
 
GovCons -0.3815 0.1309 1 
    
 
Investment 0.2485 -0.0627 -0.0980 1 
   
 
Openness 0.1998 -0.0397 0.0102 0.1890 1 
  
 
Inflation -0.0260 0.1099 -0.0066 -0.0701 -0.0619 1 
 
  UrbanPop 0.8349 -0.3686 -0.3664 0.1743 0.1412 0.0112 1 
         
 
Table 4. Correlation Country and Time Effects Controlled Data 
   
             HDI Gini GovCons Investment Openness Inflation UrbanPop 
 
HDI 1 
      
 
Gini -0.0904 1 
     
 
GovCons 0.0335 -0.0499 1 
    
 
Investment 0.2081 -0.0075 -0.0777 1 
   
 
Openness 0.0491 0.0840 0.0189 0.1441 1 
  
 
Inflation -0.0386 0.1044 0.0148 -0.0144 -0.0050 1 
 
  UrbanPop 0.3568 -0.0398 0.0914 0.0075 -0.0381 -0.0339 1 
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4 Empirical Model 
 
In our descriptive analysis above we revealed a negative overall bivariate correlation between 
inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient and human development measured by HDI. In 
order to get closer to the answer of the question whether this will hold as a causal relationship, 
we next specify an empirical model with the aim to assess the relationship once considering 
the other determinants of development established by the theoretical and empirical literature. 
We generally follow the literature on determinants of development and growth that tends to 
regress (accumulated) growth rates on initial values of explanatory variables (Sala-i-Martin et 
al. 2004). Here, we rely on Easterly’s (2007) argument and we assume that the current value 
of a development variable is the result of consecutive and accumulated years of growth. Thus, 
we look at the level of HDI rather than its growth rate. The same is done by most of the few 
papers investigating the causes of HDI. It makes particular sense when working with Hybrid 
HDI as its sub-indices are defined relative to the highest values over time and countries in 
each of the categories and thus there is a computational limit to growth. 
We define our time dimension t in five-year intervals from 1970 to 2010 so that we 
end up with nine points in time (1970, 1975, …, 2005, 2010). This is commonly done because 
most of our variables tend to be quite persistent or at least slow changing. That way we can 
increase the within country variation to exploit. All our explanatory variables are lagged in 
order to reduce the risk of joint determination and simultaneity. The Gini variable, as our 
main explanatory variable of interest and one where the endogeneity concern might be fairly 
large, is lagged by two periods.
11
 Consequently and taken all the above into account, we end 
up with the following empirical model that defines the level of HDI (or its components) as a 
function of the net Gini coefficient and controls: 
 
 
                                                            
                                                       
 
5 Results and Discussion 
 
As a starting point, we estimate our main underlying model specified above using five differ-
ent procedures, while always taking into account the multiple imputation nature (MI) and thus 
uncertainty of our inequality data and clustering the robust standard errors by countries. The 
results are presented in Table 5. Columns 1 and 2 show the pooled OLS estimates with and 
without year dummies to account for time fixed effects. Column 3 displays the (country) fixed 
effects or within estimates and column 4 the between estimates. The random effects results 
are presented in column 5. Our controls exhibit the expected signs with investment and ag-
                                                          
11 (As we will see) all of these decisions are results of a trade-off decision: Extending the defined length of the time intervals 
of analysis (here five years) increases the within variation, but decreases the number of periods that can be exploited. Lag-
ging explanatory variables can help to deal with joint, determination and simultaneity, but it also limits the time-series di-
mension for which the model can be estimated. 
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glomeration showing a positive and significant impact on human development, while gov-
ernment consumption seems to have a negative effect. Inflation and trade openness report 
coefficients that are generally not statistically significant. 
 
 
Table 5. Basic model (MI estimation). Hybrid Human Development Index. 
       (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
HDI t OLS-1 OLS-2 FE BE RE 
      Gini t-2 -0.00359*** -0.00383*** 0.000715 -0.00473*** 7.22e-05 
 
(0.000387) (0.000382) (0.000514) (0.000920) (0.000463) 
GovConsumption t-1 -0.00320*** -0.00319*** -9.80e-05 -0.00508*** -0.00106 
 
(0.00123) (0.00123) (0.00124) (0.00170) (0.00114) 
Investment t-1 0.00210*** 0.00254*** 0.000665** 0.00462*** 0.000940*** 
 
(0.000578) (0.000566) (0.000264) (0.00108) (0.000283) 
Openness t-1 0.000162* 4.70e-05 -9.58e-05 0.000250 -6.48e-05 
 
(8.49e-05) (8.99e-05) (8.32e-05) (0.000201) (9.36e-05) 
Inflation t-1 -5.42e-06 -1.25e-06 -9.79e-07 3.75e-05 -5.40e-07 
 
(6.63e-06) (6.11e-06) (1.35e-06) (5.01e-05) (1.58e-06) 
UrbanPop t-1 0.00498*** 0.00500*** 0.00222*** 0.00426*** 0.00425*** 
 
(0.000266) (0.000261) (0.000708) (0.000429) (0.000465) 
Constant 0.509*** 0.495*** 0.463*** 1.055*** 0.369*** 
 
(0.0357) (0.0360) (0.0542) (0.184) (0.0448) 
Time Fixed Effects NO YES YES YES YES 
Country Fixed Effects NO NO YES NO NO 
Observations 489 489 489 489 489 
Number of countries 
  
117 117 117 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Hausman test between RE and FE: 117.97 (p-val = 0.0000) [no MI, no robust] 
 
 
With respect to our main variable of interest, the Gini coefficient as a measure for inequality, 
we observe two similar negative and significant coefficients in our pooled OLS estimates (-
0.00359 and -0.00383 respectively) and an even more negative and also highly statistically 
significant estimate of -0.00473 in the between regression. The parameter for the fixed effects 
estimate which controls for country and time specificities turns to be not statistically different 
from zero. The random effects estimate, which is a mix of the between and fixed effects esti-
mates, does show a non-significant parameter as well. The Hausman test applied to the fixed 
and random effects estimations clearly rejects the null hypothesis of equal vectors of parame-
ters and thus implies that the fixed effects procedure is preferable over the random effects 
estimation.
12
 The test shows that the unobserved heterogeneity (/fixed effects) across clusters 
(/countries) is correlated with the explanatory variables and implies a potential endogeneity in 
the random effects estimation. 
                                                          
12 The Hausman test only works when sparing the MI and clustering option. So we estimated the same models without them. 
In any case, the results are very close to the MI and robust procedures, and consequently we believe that the obtained 
Hausman test leads to a trustable rejection decision. The estimation results can be seen in Table A.2 in the Appendix. 
15 
 
If we assume a dynamic relationship between inequality and development like Par-
tridge (2005)
13
 and other authors, then we could interpret the between estimates as a negative 
long-run impact of inequality on human development, following Baltagi and Griffin (1984) 
and Pirotte (1999). For example, country A with a Gini coefficient 5 points lower than that of 
country B can expect a 0.024 points higher HDI (or 2.4 points if we also scale the HDI to 100 
as the Gini coefficients). As HDI is a composite measure and the scale of the Gini coefficient 
can be hard to put into context, we also do this interpretation in standardized terms. The be-
tween estimation reports a standardized parameter of -0.23. Thus, if country A has a Gini co-
efficient one standard deviation lower than that of country B, we expect an HDI approximate-
ly 0.23 standard deviations higher. In a tangible example this means that, if the median coun-
try, which is Colombia,
14
 would have experienced a decrease (increase) of the Gini coefficient 
in one standard deviation, it would have increased (decreased) its HDI ranking by about 13 
(14) positions out of the 135 considered countries in the Hybrid HDI original dataset. As this 
impact seems to depend highly on average country performance and the interpretation would 
assume that we included all relevant country characteristics, one still has to be careful with 
the interpretation in terms of magnitude, even though we found evidence for a negative effect. 
The fixed effects estimates which control for country and time specificities would capture the 
shot-run impact of inequality on HDI under the above dynamic relationship assumption which 
is not statistically significant in our estimation.  
 
To lay the foundation of the next steps of our analysis, it is important for us to clarify 
that the non-significance in this first FE estimate does not necessarily imply that there exists 
no effect of the Gini coefficient on all dimensions of human development. This is the case for 
a considerable number of reasons that we briefly present and list here in order to then come 
back to one by one in the course of discussing further results: 1) HDI is a composite measure, 
so inequality might have contrasting effects on different dimensions of human development 
that cancel each other out, or in other words sum up to an unclear overall effect. 2) In a simi-
lar way, the overall impact of inequality on HDI and its components could be a sum of dis-
tinct effects for different groups of countries, particularly with respect to their level of devel-
opment, but also with respect to other possible country-group characteristics. 3) The relation-
ship between inequality and human development might not be (purely) linear or in other 
words it might depend on the initial or overall level of inequality. 4) Even for the single 
submeasures and even if the above dependencies would not be relevant, the different positive 
and negative transmission channels through which inequality has an impact might sum up to a 
unclear and insignificant overall effect. This is connected to a discussion about the right 
cross-sectional, time-series or panel data model specification and estimation technique and 
gives rise to interesting directions for future research. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 Partridge (2005) criticizes the use of fixed effects methods in a more general manner, as inequality is highly persistent over 
time and thus the disadvantages of the FE model might outweigh its advantages under certain further conditions. 
14 Here we use the median country in 1990. 
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1) The effect of inequality on the components of HDI 
 
HDI is a composite measure of development. Consequently, inequality could have different 
effects on different components of the index and dimensions of development. To check this, 
we estimate the preferred fixed effects model on the different components of HDI and present 
the results in Table 6. Indeed, we can observe that inequality has a significant positive impact 
on the logarithm of GDP (column 2). This positive fixed effects result of inequality on eco-
nomic development has been shown in the literature by Li and Zou (1998) and Forbes (2000) 
among others.
15
 The inequality effect on the literacy rate as a proxy for education outcomes 
on the other hand is negative and statistically significant, at least at 10% level (column 4). 
Thus firstly, we found evidence for a positive effect of inequality on economic outcomes and 
a negative effect on literacy rates. The latter is connected with the transmission channel linked 
to barriers in human capital formation. Both effects could happen simultaneously. Secondly, 
we saw that the aggregated HDI measuring human development reacts differently and less 
positive to inequality than the pure income measure. Consequently, as stressed above, HDI 
and its components are not redundant to GDP, but can add important insights to the develop-
ment discussion. 
 
Table 6. Fixed Effect Estimates (MI estimation). Components of HDI. 
      
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
HDI Component t HDI lGDP Life Lit GER 
      Gini t-2 0.000715 0.00911** 0.0273 -0.144* 0.0584 
 
(0.000514) (0.00399) (0.0483) (0.0761) (0.0913) 
GovConsumption t-1 -9.80e-05 0.00105 -0.159* 0.102 0.102 
 
(0.00124) (0.00852) (0.0960) (0.234) (0.164) 
Investment t-1 0.000665** 0.00508** 0.0390* -0.0606 0.153*** 
 
(0.000264) (0.00210) (0.0214) (0.0725) (0.0524) 
Openness t-1 -9.58e-05 0.00111** -0.0132 -0.0455** -0.00823 
 
(8.32e-05) (0.000549) (0.00848) (0.0221) (0.0116) 
Inflation t-1 -9.79e-07 -1.06e-05 -0.000181 0.000614*** -0.000115 
 
(1.35e-06) (1.53e-05) (0.000111) (0.000192) (0.000268) 
UrbanPop t-1 0.00222*** 0.0130* 0.166*** 0.596*** -0.180 
 
(0.000708) (0.00735) (0.0517) (0.173) (0.131) 
Constant 0.463*** 7.350*** 56.12*** 56.28*** 62.36*** 
 
(0.0542) (0.582) (3.473) (10.86) (6.718) 
Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 489 489 489 489 489 
Number of countries 117 117 117 117 117 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
       
 
 
                                                          
15 Barro (2000), Chen (2003) and Voitchovsky (2005) also find a similar positive effect, but there it depends on further condi-
tions. 
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2) Inequality and the role of the level of development 
 
In order to investigate the inequality-development relationship for different levels of devel-
opment, we incorporate a dummy variable for developed countries into our model and interact 
it with the Gini variable.
16
 Column 1 of Table 7 displays the fixed effects estimates for the 
regression of HDI. The estimate for the Gini coefficient of developing countries (base catego-
ry) now is positive and statistically significant at 10%-level. At first sight this result is in line 
with Galor and Moav (2004) who suggest that in early development stages, when physical 
capital accumulation is the prime engine of growth, inequality is growth enhancing via the 
higher propensity to save and credit market imperfections, but irrelevant for growth in devel-
oped countries,
17
 and object Barro (2000). Barro highlights the link between higher inequality 
and higher fertility rates, which in turn reduce growth given that the average investment in 
education decreases. He finds that inequality is negatively correlated with growth in low-
income countries, but positively in high-income countries, even when controlling for fertility 
rates.
18
  
 
Table 7. Interaction with Development Dummy. Fixed 
Effect Estimates (MI estimation). 
      (1) (2) (3) 
HDI Component t HDI lGDP Lit 
    Gini t-2 0.00105* 0.0128*** -0.155** 
 
(0.000585) (0.00453) (0.0774) 
Gini t-2*Developed -0.00162* -0.0178*** 0.0547 
 
(0.000821) (0.00569) (0.197) 
Controls YES YES YES 
Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Observations 489 489 489 
Number of countries 117 117 117 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
     
However, if we take a closer look at the components of HDI individually, we can actually 
reconcile these two seemingly conflicting papers and standpoints. Column 2 presents a posi-
tive and significant fixed effect estimate of the impact of inequality on the logarithm of GDP 
for developing countries. The effect for developed countries is more negative and adds up to a 
negative impact which is not significantly different from zero. This results hints at the physi-
cal capital accumulation argument made by Galor and Moav for early development stages. By 
contrast, column 3 presents the respective estimates for the literacy rate and a negative and 
                                                          
16 In accordance with the Human Development Reports we define as developed countries those classified as possessing a 
“very high human development”, that means an HDI of above 0.8. The final list basically coincides with that of the UN. 
Notice that the level dummy is omitted in fixed effects estimations as our definition of development is based on 2010 values 
and hence does not change over time. 
17 For developed countries the two estimates sum to a small negative coefficient which is not significantly different from zero. 
18 In Barro (2000) the overall effect turns insignificant when controlling for fertility, but the development-dependent results 
hold. 
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significant effect of inequality on this education outcome. The aggregate impact for developed 
countries seems to be less negative.
19
 This latter result is in line with Barro’s findings of a 
negative effect of inequality on development in developing countries through higher fertility 
rates and thus lower investment in education. We performed such estimates on the other com-
ponents of HDI as well, but there we found no evidence for the dependence on the level of 
development. 
To summarize, we saw clear evidence for both: A negative effect of inequality on de-
velopment via education or human capital accumulation hinting at the endogenous fertility 
approach; and a positive effect of inequality on development via physical capital accumula-
tion hinting at the higher aggregate savings, both particularly for developing countries. Thus, 
our results reconcile Barro (2000) and Galor and Moav (2004).
20
 With respect to overall HDI 
the physical capital accumulation argument seems to outweigh the fertility argument for de-
veloping countries, at least in the short-run. 
 
 
3) Non-linearity or the role of the level of inequality 
 
To answer the question whether the relationship between inequality and HDI might be non-
linear in a way that it depends on the level of inequality predominant in the economy, we start 
by estimating a stripped-down fixed effects model. In this estimation we regress HDI on the 
Gini coefficient and its square without further controls (column 1). 
 
Table 8. Interaction with Level of Inequality (FE and MI estimates). 
    
 
(1) (2) (3) 
HDIt 
Squared – 
No controls 
Squared - 
Controls 
Interaction 
    Gini t-2 0.0116*** 0.00185 0.00125* 
 
(0.00277) (0.00186) (0.000741) 
Ginit-2
2 
-0.000126*** -1.47e-05 
 
 
(3.56e-05) (2.19e-05) 
 Gini t-2*HIGH 
  
-0.00121 
   
(0.000835) 
Controls NO YES YES 
Time Fixed Effects NO YES YES 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Observations 510 489 489 
Number of countries 117 117 117 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
     
                                                          
19
 Although the interaction parameter is not statistically significant here, if we estimate the same regression for the subsample 
of developed countries the coefficient is close to 0 and insignificant. 
20
 Interestingly both these transmission channels are linked to and reinforced by capital market imperfection likely to be 
observed in developing countries where investment indivisibilities lead to positive effects of inequality on physical capital 
investment, but negative effects on human capital investment/education. 
19 
 
The results show evidence of a quadratic correlation structure with a significantly 
positive parameter for the Gini index and a smaller, negative and significant parameter for its 
square. In such a way, if we assume a causal relationship, increasing inequality would have a 
positive effect on development for low levels of inequality, but this effect would turn negative 
for high levels of inequality (or other countries with a high level). Some authors like Chen 
(2003) find such a shifting impact that depends on the (initial) income distribution. When we 
include our controls and time fixed effects again (column 2) to get closer to such a causal in-
terpretation however, the coefficient signs remain the same, but the estimates are much small-
er and not significant any more.  Next, we divide all our countries in two equally-sized groups, 
those with relatively low and those with relatively high levels of inequality, create a dummy 
variable for the second group and interact it with the Gini coefficient in a linear fixed effects 
model in order to allow for some structural instability in terms of the level of inequality (col-
umn 3). We find that the estimate for the low inequality group is positive and statistically sig-
nificant at 10%-level. Although the interaction parameter for the high income countries is not 
significantly different, if we estimate the same regression for the countries with high inequali-
ty only, we detect a non-significant parameter close to zero. 
Taken these results together, we conclude that we found some hints for a possible non-
linearity of the impact of inequality on HDI or in other words for an effect that is dependent 
on the level of inequality itself. Increasing inequality might be more positive for countries 
with low levels of inequality compared to those with higher levels. However, this evidence is 
still not clear, definitive or unambiguous in our data and needs more research and robustness. 
 
 
4) Discussion and future research 
 
Even without the above dependencies and even for the single subindicators, we might have a 
situation in which the different impact channels sum up to an unclear overall result. This can 
particularly affect the fixed effects estimations. The main argument behind using them is that 
they allow controlling for omitted time-invariant factors. However, if the underlying causal 
determinants of the development process are persistent, the long-run cross-sectional impacts 
will be subsumed into the fixed effects, something that has been noted by Fallah and Partridge 
(2007). If in addition the key (omitted) time-invariant factors like the quality of institutions 
are those to which a negative effect of inequality is related, then the fixed effects estimate are 
upwards/positively biased at least when interested in longer-run development. Castells-
Quintana and Royuela (2014) found some evidence for the above. In future and subsequent 
research it would be interesting for us to follow the cross-sectional strategy they use to asses 
economic growth and apply it to human development, HDI and its components: By instru-
menting inequality with different instruments proxying the various transmission channels and 
using a system of recursive equations by means of a control function approach, we could gain 
further important insights about the simultaneous impact channels through which inequality 
affects human development and how this effect might be different compared to the one on 
economic growth. At the same time we could account for any potentially remaining 
endogeneity and would not need to lag the inequality variable. The instruments for example 
20 
 
would explicitly include a fertility measure, a variable that is reported as important in Barro 
(2000) and in the present work. 
 The full selection, discovery and retrieval of appropriate external instruments for ine-
quality and its channels demand a lot of caution, can be difficult and for data availability rea-
sons maybe even impossible for panel analyses with a considerable coverage of countries and 
years. Hence, there is another option to tackle the potential endogeneity problem with internal 
instruments while at the same time addressing an additional econometric concern, the dynam-
ic panel model bias. This option is the Blundell and Bond “system” GMM estimator (1998). 
When the actual underlying model is dynamic and exhibits endogenous persistence, that is 
when the endogenous variable depends highly on a lagged endogenous variable as a regressor, 
fixed effects might suffer a bias when the number of periods is small as they are in our case.
21
 
In this case consistent estimations can be carried out using the Blundell and Bond estimator. 
This system GMM estimator uses internal instruments based on past values of the variable to 
instrument possibly endogenous regressors, first differences are instrumented with lagged 
levels and levels with lagged changes. 
We tried to estimate such a dynamic model by system GMM, but encountered some 
substantial obstacles that demand further attention, work and sophistication outside the aim 
and scope of this paper. The first and main difficulty is connected to the multiple imputation 
nature of our data. The common statistical softwares generally only (fully) support a limited 
list of estimation techniques with imputed data. Even if estimations can be carried out, they 
are troublesome, demand further caution and have major limitations, especially with respect 
to post-estimation commands and tests. With the MI estimations we cannot perform the im-
portant Hansen/Sargan and autocorrelation tests that the Blundell and Bond estimator crucial-
ly depends on. These tests are possible with a simple regression on the mean of imputations, 
but that would violate the correct treatment of our inequality data. In addition, in the above 
cases parameters and standard errors were substantially different for some estimations we 
could carry out so that we are not confident enough to present reliable and robust results with 
their interpretations and implications. Moreover, also with respect to the required assumptions 
underlying our model, we would need to be cautious. The validity of the additional instru-
ments in system GMM rely on the assumption that countries are not too far from their respec-
tive steady states so that changes in the instrumenting variables are not systematically related 
to the fixed effects. All in all and in the scope and aim of this paper we are not confident 
enough to present robust and reliable results for the dynamic estimations. Thus, we decided to 
concentrate on the above fixed effects estimations and results and leave the dynamic estima-
tions as a next step for subsequent research outside the scope of this paper. 
  
                                                          
21
As we said before, the small number of periods was the result of a trade-off decision with respect to our data. We could 
extend the number of periods by defining shorter time intervals, but then we would have even more persistent variables and 
loose within variation. 
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6 Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this study was to create a starting point for the empirical analysis of the im-
pact of inequality on a broader measure of development in general and human development as 
measured by the Human Development Index in particular. As relatively little has been done in 
this direction so far, we started by reviewing and connecting two fields of literature – one 
about the impact and different transmission channels of inequality on economic development 
and growth and the other about the necessity for a broader concept and measure of (human) 
development with the HDI as a main alternative to pure income measures. Although some of 
the impact channels clearly work through not purely economic variables, but are connected to 
other dimensions of development, prosperity and wellbeing, this connection has not been 
made explicitly and in an empirical model. 
In our panel analysis we found evidence for a negative long-run effect of inequality on 
human development. At the same time our results suggest that the impact of inequality can be 
substantially different for the different dimensions of HDI and aspects of development. This 
emphasizes the complexity of the relationships between the income distribution and develop-
ment and recommends the use of alternative development measures as HDI complementary to 
GDP. Using HDI we found evidence for the simultaneous existence of a positive impact on 
economic growth, but a negative effect on education outcomes. Connecting this to the stage of 
development, we were able to reconcile two seemingly conflicting theories. As both of these 
effects are particularly strong in developing countries, the total inequality impact on devel-
opment in early development stages could be both positive or negative depending on which of 
the two effects dominates the other. For overall HDI the effect of inequality seems to be more 
positive for developing countries than for developed countries. Moreover, we also find some 
hints for a quadratic relationship or a dependence on the level of inequality. In that way in-
creasing inequality could have a positive impact on development when inequality is low, but a 
negative impact when it is high already. All in all, HDI can give important and new insight 
about the transmission channels and impact mechanisms behind the effects of inequality. 
Looking at human development is not redundant to looking at GDP as it adds more relevant 
dimensions to the development discussion. Our results can have important implications for 
development policy and help policy makers understand how inequality is affecting the process 
of development and not just if or to what extent. 
While in general the analysis of the effect of inequality on HDI (and alternative devel-
opment measures) needs more research and robustness, we pointed out two different specific 
directions for future and subsequent research in the last part of our discussion. First, the im-
plementation of a dynamic and endogenous panel model requires more work and sophistica-
tion. Second, it would be interesting to find instruments proxying the different transmission 
channels and estimate a cross-sectional model with a control function approach to find out 
even more about the multifarious effects of inequality on human development and compare 
them to the ones on economic growth. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1. Variable Description 
  
    
Label Description Source Coverage 
    
Hybrid HDI 
Hybrid HDI values, 
HDI=(Lifex*EDUx*GDPx)^(1/3) 
United Nations Development Programme - 
Human Development Report 2010 
1970 - 2010 for 135 
countries, balanced 
HDI Rank Hybrid HDI ranks 
United Nations Development Programme - 
Human Development Report 2010 
1970 - 2010 for 135 
countries, balanced 
Life Life Expectancy 
United Nations Development Programme - 
Human Development Report 2010 
1970 - 2010 for 135 
countries, balanced 
Lifex 
Health Index, Lifex=(Life-
20)/83.17(Japan,2010)-20) 
United Nations Development Programme - 
Human Development Report 2010 
1970 - 2010 for 135 
countries, balanced 
Lit Adult Literacy Rate 
United Nations Development Programme - 
Human Development Report 2010 
1970 - 2010 for 135 
countries, balanced 
Litx 
Literacy Index, Litx=(Lit-0)/(99(several coun-
tries, several years)-0) 
United Nations Development Programme - 
Human Development Report 2010 
1970 - 2010 for 135 
countries, balanced 
GER Combined Gross Enrolment Rate 
United Nations Development Programme - 
Human Development Report 2010 
1970 - 2010 for 135 
countries, balanced 
GERx 
Combined Gross Enrolment Rate Index, 
GERx=(GER-0)/(115.82(Australia,2002)-0) 
United Nations Development Programme - 
Human Development Report 2010 
1970 - 2010 for 135 
countries, balanced 
EDUx Education Index, EDUx=(Litx*GERx)^(1/2) 
United Nations Development Programme - 
Human Development Report 2010 
1970 - 2010 for 135 
countries, balanced 
GDP GDP per capita, PPP$ 
United Nations Development Programme - 
Human Development Report 2010 
1970 - 2010 for 135 
countries, balanced 
GDPx 
Income Index, GDPx=(ln(GDP)-
ln(163.28(Liberia,1995))/(ln(106769.74(UAE, 
1977))-ln(163.28)) 
United Nations Development Programme - 
Human Development Report 2010 
1970 - 2010 for 135 
countries, balanced 
        
    
Gini 
Net (post-tax, post-transfer) Income Inequality 
Gini Indices (100 imputations) 
Standardized World Income Inequality 
Database (SWIID), Version 5.0, October 
2014, Solt (2014). 
1960 - 2013 for 174 
countries, unbal. 
        
    
GovConsumption 
Government Consumption Share of PPP Con-
verted GDP Per Capita at 2005 constant prices 
[rgdpl] (%) 
Penn World Table 7.1, Nov 2012, Heston et 
al. (2012). 
1950 - 2011 for 189 
countries, unbal. 
Investment 
Investment Share of PPP Converted GDP Per 
Capita at 2005 constant prices [rgdpl] (%) 
Penn World Table 7.1, Nov 2012, Heston et 
al. (2012). 
1950 - 2011 for 189 
countries, unbal. 
Openness Openness at 2005 at constant price (%) 
Penn World Table 7.1, Nov 2012, Heston et 
al. (2012). 
1950 - 2011 for 189 
countries, unbal. 
        
    
Inflation Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) 
World Development Indicators, April 2016, 
World Bank (2016). 
1960 - 2015 for 214 
countries, unbal. 
UrbanPop Urban population (% of total) 
World Development Indicators, April 2016, 
World Bank (2016). 
1960 - 2015 for 214 
countries, unbal. 
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Table A.2. FE and RE estimates for Hausman Test. (NoMI, 
noVCE). 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
FE RE FE RE 
 
(NoMI) (NoMI) (NoMI) (NoMI) 
HDI t   
(NoVCE) (NoVCE) 
  
    Gini t-2 0.000825 8.41e-05 0.000825 8.41e-05 
 
(0.000551) (0.000483) (0.000492) (0.000314) 
GovConsumption t-1 -8.88e-05 -0.00106 -8.88e-05 -0.00106* 
 
(0.00123) (0.00114) (0.000534) (0.000574) 
Investment t-1 0.000665** 0.000940*** 0.000665*** 0.000940*** 
 
(0.000264) (0.000282) (0.000208) (0.000231) 
Openness t-1 -9.58e-05 -6.48e-05 -9.58e-05** -6.48e-05 
 
(8.26e-05) (9.36e-05) (4.82e-05) (5.32e-05) 
Inflation t-1 -1.02e-06 -5.52e-07 -1.02e-06 -5.52e-07 
 
(1.32e-06) (1.58e-06) (3.01e-06) (3.42e-06) 
UrbanPop t-1 0.00222*** 0.00425*** 0.00222*** 0.00425*** 
 
(0.000706) (0.000467) (0.000338) (0.000264) 
Constant 0.458*** 0.369*** 0.458*** 0.369*** 
 
(0.0555) (0.0459) (0.0226) (0.0224) 
Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Country Fixed Ef-
fects YES NO YES No 
Observations 489 489 489 489 
R-squared 0.838 
 
0.838 
 Number of countries 117 117 117 117 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Hausman test between RE and FE: 117.97 (p-val = 0.0000) 
 
      
